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A preliminary analysis of some hu^an factors as they re-
late to CoTnanl ana Control (C?) is Performed. A general
model of a C2 system is iiscussed» ana a node within that
system is isolated for further study. The human factors of
informational loading, informational relevancy/ and data
availacility are discussed and then an experiment is per-
formed to ascertain whether any relat ionshios exist between
these factors. Comments on the test procedures and the ex-
perimental medium used* the a> E S ( xar f are Effectiveness Simu-
lator) w a r g a m e # are made in view of possible pitfalls that
can pe experienced in human factors research. This work
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An S 3 - A Viking on A S w oatrol ahead of a carrier task
group in the eastern Mediterranean Dicks uo a hostile air
search radar on its E S w (electronic sensory measures) gear.
This information is relayed to the ASw air control ship
which in turn alerts the task group commander on the E to
(electronic warfare) net. The task aroup commander orders
the duty A E N (airborne early warning) aircraft to alter its
flight oattern to attempt to get a visual/radar fix on the
intruder. The AE^ aircraft gets a radiar contact and an ES^
LOB (line of bearing) that correlates with the contact.
These bo-th correlate with the S3-A's initial intercept. The
AE.Ai aircraft enters a hostile surface symbol into the ship-
aircraft data link at the correct position and the hostile
is now on the scopes of all NTOS (navy tactical data system)
eauioped shios. The task group commander now orders one of
the SAG (surface action grouo) units to enqaoe the hostile
with Harooon missiles. Scratch one hostile platform.
This is the tactical OTH (over the horizon) targeting
problem solved (under ideal conditions) by command and con-
trol assets currently available to the fleet. The task group
commander, utilizing raoid correlation of information
derived from sensors external to his flagship, evaluates and
prosecutes a hostile platform beyond the range of his own
shipboard sensors. The SAG unit has fired upon a hostile
platform its own sensors have not detected, but based on in-

formation readily available via its NTDS link with the car-
rier and the a E.n aircraft. A classic examole of command and
control at wo r < .
Command and control (C2) assets have frailties too; sus-
ceotibility to jammina and to deceotion, lack of available
data* and vu
1
nerao i 1 i t v to damage* just to mention a few. In
order to guard against system frailties we must understand
how the system/ or parts of it/ functions in time of stress.
If we can begin to observe how the system functions* we may
be able to decipher whicH oarts of the system are most cru-
cial to the good oerformance of such a system. This paper
will attempt to isolate a oortion of a C2 system and will
analyze and attemot „to predict its actions under various
conditions of stress through the use of gaming and simula-








1 q r -v ~> ;' »ni - , .. - ^ -, | ^vs^.em can be viewed as a large/
cooderous o ;:1 -* s t t n =u everyone d a n t s to 3 e t h o 1 ri of/ ^i ser f »
u? jrio, c a t a I o n • i e § ind ~ a < -° f => - t ^ r , h e 1 1 e r » on a invulner-
able. >* s yef f thouih, the b p ^ ? t n a s not o e e n caught. T n e
main thru si- of this study wi 1 I t ° directed not at an entire
C c s v s f e ~ / nut r 3 r -> <= r ^ ^na of i^s many complex carts? that
o o i n t at i« h i c h man and -n a c n i n e interact to create a d e c i s i o n
n r s, series :> * ff;cis ions *• n i c h f >« i I 1 call a decision point .
:' Decision point can r p t h o u o h t of as existing at. any of
v-?r i cj i levels of the c n a i n n * c? n "3^'i. For ° * a nn o 1 e * con-
sider the '' T. C r a d a r interceot officer) in the bac< seat of
an F-]'-i, =* C I C (combat information c e r> t a r ) ?hoari a shin, on
-. l F C C (task force c o m t> a n d renter) 3 roar-; en aircraft car-
r i e r .
To +at i li ' ^e our discussion • ° should first take a
look at >t h a t t n e a e n e r a I shac? nt a C 2 s y s t e m is and observe
ho .^ so^f5 of it? basic ,| i'i c f ions interact. /. e will need to
ri p rpe no s O T e n a S i C ':-^imf irn; for this discussion/ cpgin-
nina with « h a t pxactlv is a C «? system, ^or the purrose of
this s t u d y # /• e snail Define it as e system that is capable
of extract i no 3 a t a f r o -r the rnvi mn-pent > sorting am anilyz-
i n o that 1 d» t a » vi 1 passing that refined lata (information)
en to a decision point , if t?r the j e c i s i c n s are rp a o e t the
svstem rust hp caoaolp of passim that decision on to tne
aporooriate action units that c an interact with the environ-

i^nf in a c C 3 r i , n r ° >. i •" h S i ) C h decisions.
r h e tar' ?ivi ronr?nf j -* 3 ussii herei n» refers tn the ob-
ject ^ o r 1 ri C j t I 3r 3? o < j t s i oe * our C ? system. I r lives rise
t c a f 1 n 1 r J > 3 ] t n /> ->r,
;>-••-> ;. - - constantly varyinof amount
n f r j ^ t a t h a t is subject to retrieval o y the s v s t e m through
any of a series of sensors. The environ Tent is Subject to
chan-je y T a r 1 i ? • 1 j 1 -» t i o n 3 jon? by a c t n r s . Friendly an'1 neutral
actors r a r e l v -n a < e or influence ^ n unfavorable cnanqe. Hos-
tile actor , nil! re attemotina to change the en™
vironment r ^ their* ?jvan tao«! which wo u I n mean depriving
friendly sensors of infor."nation* r oresentinq them with
false o^ cooFMctina ci a * a . ' 1 so to ha adores sed later w i 1 1
be the tactic o ' overloadino the envi*ronrnent with a t a in an
a 1 1 e m D t to b o o 1own a C .? s v s t e t. . A sensor can he one o f
various sources f 2 a t a » such as an intelligence aoent in
t h e Meld or 3 ' E .'i 3 ( * a l I i s t i c ' i s S i l e early ." amino S y s -
t ,=>
"r ) radar 3 1 t e .
C n c e the sensors r a v a o a t h e r a d data from the envi ron-
t- e n 1 1 it i^ r> 3 s 3 a a a l on j the data links or ofner communica-
tions means to a yrrol jM^ n -? i r, t . t n o u t s tc a correlation
cnint ca n coma f r o ^ ~ =* n ^ r <; tt f r o m other ccrralation
mints. 'i?ra tn^ ^ w 1 i 1 a ~< ! o data en i r^,; information are a s -
siiilatpo, v a r i M e 1 a n r^^or-r^tt^o as orocessed information
that can e J r a a 'i i 1 y u s e o to ail in ^ decision making d"o-
cess* This ?nfnr-n3tion is conveyed via some communications
system to 3 i a c i s i o n ncint . Decisions eon n <= c e s s a r y informa-
tion a r e then r e 1 a y ?» d to ... a i t i n o action units. The environ-

t e n t is fKen al ^reo b v • c f t r s » new o a t a ^eccn^s available*
3 n o r i^ c v c 1 - <• ? ' - j c 3 . F i o u p e [ T - a graohically 5no.,s the
s v 3 1 em •-.. <* ->-•/- •* 3 «c r i f - o" .
)ur r £ jvst- ?^ "i ?. s 5 o m a p a s i c coeratino characteristics
an.i limitations t r. 3 t .-1 5 should familiarize ourselves with,
^s is true o * any system that c! ° a 1 s -i i t h flows an 1 Quanti-
ties (hpp° o 1 information)* 1 1-< 1 s svs^°i is sensitive to
overloading* so -)ur stu~*v should reflect this* and the si"
t u a t i on will r. 3 li scussei in more i e t a i 1 in C haoter III.
1 a t a flows t n p o 1 1 o h j- h a s y s r. ° - t-^~> h h e sensors up * and at
each o c i n t i t e"<r>°riences some tine delay attributable to
c mi m u n i c a t i o n 3 p e 1 4 v time* corral at ion checks* human over*
sioht f or even the old "oi aeon hoi " s v n o r o m e . This time d e
-
l^tv reflects :^ the 1 a t a ' s true worth* si^ce the less delay
r h e information n 3 ^ a^soci atei with it-* the more appropriate
the a ec i s i o n s based on it ure likely to re. A classic exam-
ple of this is fojn i in t •"> e n r o P 1 e m of r H taroef inj, where
i^fnr^ar iro nnl v minutes old may d e t^cHc^l 1 v useless.
Another e < a mo 1 e is that of t ^ e ! C C (National v i 1 i t a r y Com-
mand Canter! -j 3 1 1 i n o j e 1 a v e d information about a ° i n -
openness nuclear attack* since f Hp u " ' C C will only exist tor
scdnt minuter jurim ~'.<c n an at 1, ac 1'.
Our C <£ system is» of course* also vulnerable to physi-
cal n" a m e :i e . Satellites* ground stations* microwave networks
3 no around c a n 1 <=> ^ r ^ 3 1 | vulnerable to s a n o t a n e * E *1 P (el pc*
t r o magnetic o u 1 s e J effects or valorization by a ruclaar



















to d e a r a d e svst e^ ngrf orniancs. ^ s 3 u m. i n a *or t K e moment that
s/it^i oprf or^Tncs is n p a s u r e d h y so^e cc^hi nat i on o *
t i t e / v o 1 u m e F I c> ft ? i i 3 1 a measurement* then eliminatinp any
::?inc or I i n '< in our svste 1 obviously "ieorades its o e r f o r -
T V'C9.
T n e r f is ^ difference between trie outout o * sensors and
t no outDut c f correlation noints f d a t a vs refined data or
information)* r u t if *• e ^ccert r L-> e output of ho^ as a
t- i r e / v o I u m e f 1 o •-' o ( information to n e refined a f the next
n o o e u o the chain c f r. o m ^ b n d / f h -:n t- o t s should 3 o p e a r to
b e n a v e in a ^ < "
i
1 3 r r a n n e r i n our mac r o - s v s t em view. The
rr> o o e 1 in Ficrjre r I - a > •< h i c ts has been ^ a s i c in our d i s c u s s i o n
c * t^e. ov^ral 1 'v;'^-" structure* is still much too compli-
cated to s 1 1: iv in i e o t h s- s a s i n q 1 e entity. In order to jus-
t i
+
i y t r . e n 3 r r o '•> i n . 3 i o .«' n o * our field of Study of the 3 v s -
t- a -
, ,., e ^ p p. o o i n a to h ove * n establish a n o justify one new
concept * namelv that a ^eci^ioo coint is Terelv a soecial-
i z e d or evolved f ~ r ^ nf correlation point. To this end/ let
us take a closer 1 o
o
'* at *" u ° functions of the two.
[no function of ? c ^""^Ur i on o o i n t is to " a < e inouts
f r or> a n v n u m c e r of various sources e n o analyze these inputs.
Inouts can ccie directly from sensors or t-hoy can cone f^om
other c^rr^l jHon o o i n t s . T h e evaluation crocess consists of
te*inn information g v a i 1 a h 1 e and determinino whether or not
it is consistent . 1 >'•'-< o^har information on tne s a ti e subject*
or, if not, f i o u r i n "5 out u k-^t the sioniticance of the
difference is. dissimilar oortinns of inforTation are oieced
12

toaetheP/ f i p s t in n r o e r t- o U e v e 1 c o the o v e r a 1 I picture of
.,
- < t is h a o p e n i o a / ;ni t h e n t j^tpr the initial picture is
r 1 -_ a r , f q keen an ? c c ; 1 r e t - tr^c< of that picture. ' n <=» x a t. —
o I € r>f t ^ i 3 . - 1 1 1 < " c- .» ip^t rover C I C usi nq its r^n^rs to
detect inco^i n-i aircraft* )r>-i raoortioo the n u nr-b e r * altitude
sni d p o b a b 1 e t v o e of aircpaft to t K e A A pj (anM -ai r warfare)
coopdinatof on the f I a q s h i o
.
Tip o U t o u t of a corra] ?f i ^n Doint is inforTatinn; usu-
ally of a lesser v o 1 1 j rr. a but in a Tore p e a a i 1 y u 3 a o 1 e form
* h i c n is oasse^ to a n o t h => p correi at i on c o i n t or to a ripe ison
d o i n t • r h u s toe t a j o r act of a corbel at ion c^int is to pro -
cess ana summarize I a p o e vol UTies o * information into more
easily used i nforfna^ion a n p to reduce r a w in format ional
bulk.
A decision n oiit functions in a similar manner. It re-
ceives i not s f rof various sources and performs so^e basic
functions o f co^oari son ani i ^r ^rrrpt a*1 i en of the informa-
tion, ft f t e p t h p information has e e n consolidated the oeci-
^ion poi^t '^""ns^riros its ; ii f^rr-rce from a correlation
o 1 n t . In a o o i t i o n to c a s s i n n on r e f i n e el i n f o r m a t i o n , the
oecision point 3 1 s utilizes its own output of information
to t1 3 k e one or rr o r e decisions based on the situation it oer-
C e i v e s • he "1 e c i 5 i o n hecores cart of the information oassei
on to action u^i '=. and sensor units.
So it apoears to 1 • e a valid concept that since decision
o c i n t s an .1 the c nr r«l ;t ion points have pi O S t o f their
processes in cottop (the diffepeoce r a i n a 1 1> a t the oecison
13

o o i n t is art i v c - m a k i n q iii^rvn ^-^nf audi t ions to the infer-
n f ion in t h e for^ C 1 "i a C i S i n s ) r^^y can in fact be
^^l yzei i " M t ft ° 1 r efficiency in basically the s a rr « way.
-
-. o
-p v o r before t. ft a • we stated t ft a t a C I C % a s a good e x a m o 1 e
o * a correlation n o i n t . r n conflicts in w h i c ft t ft e oest rover
I
s; a senior --^-r iri-nn 1: , it (tr^ TIC) is fully c a o a b 1 e of
act ina as a iec sion point. *' e will now nrocesd with this
flssyiot i on of similarity of roles in m i n d
'.', e can a * a m i n e ' 1 1 1 r C 2 system in terms o f a series of
nr:^) struct J r ^3/ c r a network. The o u t o u t (raw information
C r nit- a) fro* a - -^ r l J :=; of T^n^or.^ flows if 1 to one or pore
c c r
r
e 1 a t i o n o o i n t 5 # irn fHe cutout (processed data* or re-
fined information) f r o ^ 1 ^orip-; of correlation noints flows
into one c r more decision coints. J ijt no^» a o i n a on the
predication t n a t a decision ooint is notrino <vo r ° t ft an a
specialized correlation ooint » and considering that all
transactions bet* e 3 n entity types involve compatible
t i'^e^vcl uTe flows of intrrTaH^-i (otherwise extreme conges -
t i n ano OeMv w o u ' s occur)* we can assume that t n e st rue -
t u r « of the system in binjre 1 1 - a is actually composed of
s ° v e r a 1 smaller n o T a 1 :i ;>r :><? similar to t ft e o n e shown in
Figure I I ~ b
.
file ca r n q . q y ,j ••> ; p ^ t- i-i ' $ smaller o i e c e of the s v s f e ^
t n r e c a n ? f j i 1 v . [ f we "j I 1 o vu ourselves the 1 u < u r v of oec i j-
irn. what t K ^ time/vplij-ne flow of information coming through
rro conunK-if ioo^; i i ^ 3 ^ v i I 1 be (i.e. constructing our own
inputs into the ^o 1 a i r> question) * e can s a e f r a t several
14








Basic Nodal Structure of a C2 System
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r^inrs w o r t h v c f px^T.insMon ii'iopap. first; does fnp coi"nun-
i c ^ t i o n s 1 i r> «, r . • v o 3 3 >j 1 f i c i e n t c a c a c i t v to ^ancilp the
j ti c jf f r . ' t i " , jn s a -i e traffic b a c '< ur -js a
r - - 1 1 1 t of v p r 1 O ? n i n J : h ^ t occurs ^hgn *" reaches
processina de 1 a v s # r* u t the important < ; u e s t i o n s to be a a -
dressed ar«; 1) *jhat occurs in the node itself during dif-
ferent 1 o a d i n q levels* these r a n o i n a 'fo^ 9 I bc^ of informa-
tion to saturation ,•< i t h " inform at ion" # thus p<cee^iir>i its
c "> o a c i t y to : - r ' :> " -• its correlation tuner ion; ? ) ^ h a t ef-
fects do inaccurate ^ r r » r " . t - • j l y inaccurate information have
nn the a b i 1 i t v o t a o e c i s i o n ooi nt t o function normally
through all load l e v e 1 s ?
There * r & essential 1 v t r, r<^ t h i n a s that can occur at an
overloaded o o i n t . F i r s r • the information Drocessinq and
storing process c a n just . o - slower and slower* f a ' 1 i n q
+
' j r t h e r and further o e h i n q the actual military situation*
until the d r o c e s s sitter o r i n d s to a halt or the load levels
s u o s i d e f allowing the system to c a t c h ud. T n i s would be the
c-"5^ a with 3 relatively inflexible system* for exatiol e opp
t H 3 t is very heriware/soft-, are oriented. N o w we can consider
making a human far ^crf prominent in the system* in w n i c h
c a 3 * two n^r n o 3 s i h 1 e alternative actions arise. A h u ^ a n
c o u 1 d o o t f n r processing only that information n e needed
necessary an - ? i in i Meant at t r> q t i -n p> , 3 1 1 o w i n q Other infor-
r-it ion to f 3 ' l n v the side. T h i s decision « o u 1 d prevent the
s v s t e m f roT; o o o o i n a a o w n , nut at the same t i m e * this s e 1 e c -
16

t i v e scraDDinq of information means that decisions are not
basei on all available information. This example is relevant
to the T A (Tactical Action Officer) on a surface combatant
in an active threat environment from submarines, surface
shies and aircraft. His screening system (CIC) may break
down Partially and he will be forced to do some gross and
accordingly inefficient screening himself.
The other human alternative would be to sense that the
system is getting hopelessly behind and take the drastic ac-
tion of comoletely scraooing his automated picture of the
situation, dumping his backlog/ and restarting his picture
from scratch. An example of this would be the follow inq:
when NTDS units are in a multi-ship link, extraneous infor-
mation generated by the participating units will sometime
overtax the onboard computer of one of the units, causing it
to fall behind and show other symptoms such as the refusal
to accept new inouts. Ry drooping out of the link, purging
the memory of the computer and reloading the program, an
NTDS unit can come back into the link and rebuild its tacti-
cal information in a total time of about ten minutes.
Our model should consider all three of these aspects of
behavior, since most C2 systems are man-machine tvpes.
Another pertinent item to be considered is that of validity
of data and data sources and the impact of these items on
the ability of the dec i son makers to function. Man tends to
hedge decisions against uncertainty, so our model should be




In summary, in this chaoter we have defined the basic
structure of a general command and control system model,
studied its functional parts, and determined that a general
similarity exists between its internal functional parts that
allows us to examine one of these Parts (a correlation or
decision point) as a general case. This leads us on to exam-
ine in the next chapter how load and validity should affect
this decision/correlation Qoint model, and to then proceed
to design a model for simulation of noaal behavior unaer




III. A 01 SCUSSIOM OF HUMAN FACTORS
The correlation/ decision point we examined in Chaoter II
can be thought of in one form as a command center. In shift-
ing attention from a C2 system analysis to an analysis of a
oarticular node within the svstem, we will hereafter refer
to the correlation/decision Doint as command center. This
the point is at which "it all happens"/ the d o i n t where
available inputs terminate? and from which come the results
of the decision making process. Here is where the man-
machine interface exists to aid a decision maker/ and where
the decision maker exists-. A command center cah be as simple
and basic as a manually plotted CIC/ or as highly auto m.a ted
as the N M C C * but its basic function remains the same: to
monitor the situation for which the command center is
responsible/ and to attempt to make correct/ timely/ deci-
sions. The Durpose of this chapter will be to examine those
factors that affect a command center under stress conditions
in order to develop a model that will effectively simulate a
command center's resDonse to stress.
A command center is subject to stress in various forms
that can adversely effect its performance. A command center
can be overworked or underworked/ both of which impair ef-
fectiveness. The hiaher the level of irrelevant information
mixed in with pertinent information/ the more strain is put
on the command center's filtering orocess. The amount of in-
formation available on a subject of interest can detract
]9

f rnt\ ef ^ ic ' °ncv if- it is too little or too m u c h . A co""nanrl
center's normal 3 c r ivi r i ^ c ^ n be lisrupted tor a time if a
co'nol etel y j n j y - e c t - " event o * significance catches it- by
surprise — i sort n t .-;->• r •. factor. - 1 ' these ua.rianl? si-
tuations a^*'°ct 1 1"1 *? coniT-ii'i center's ao i 1 i t v to rra^e timely
a n ci icconr ^ 1 e c i s i o n s to various aeorees. r t is fn°sp fac-
tors m n i c h we mill examine in a e t a i 1 • Our comouter model for
simulation of crisis reflects the i n t e r o 1 a v of fnese fac-
tors.
\. LOAD LtV F LS
Loi'lin : levels on t c O m -n a n d center o 1 a y an i t o o r t o n t
oa r t in exa-ni n i n ^ a command c^nfop's resoonse to stress. T n e
average o e r s o n c^n •> s s i ^ i h t- » ^ new niece of J a t a about a
situation a v e r v three minutes with optimum results for r e -
t e n t i o n ann understanding, it h i o h e r r a t <? s of input he will
tend to become overloaded »>i f h -ore information tn^n n e can
comorehend and u s e . Consider nc»; much data can potentially
be thrown together concerning tactical situations. T t should
c e aooarent that an soorooriate filtering and condensing
o r o c e s s in the c o m t a n 3 center becomes very i T-nortant to p n -
sure that the ~* <* c i s i n m a * e r /-ill not e inundated with
data. On the other h 3 n 3 » if the command center becomes un-
aerloaded* i * s efficiency * i 1 1 a 1 c rv e impaired. This is
oerhaps because of 3 u n d e r u t i 1 i z aM o n data a v a i 1 a h 1 e and the
tendency of the human mind to ., 3 n '- <» r >* h e n not challenged.
This concpor of 1 n a o level's effects is illustrate;)
20

p r a o h i c a 1 1 y
t i o n a 1 1 o a :
a - e a s u r tP o
in F j -.-j i j p e I T [ - a where we see a clef of jnforma-
? r s u s . ' equality-Quantity index), The Qui is
f C riT cl »v Pftcisicn nakina w r > i c h is "an i n n i c a n t
q f tug rieor°o to • n i c ' Me iec i 31 en r»? a k i nq sequence tiurina
k
- e O ! a v 1 r i t: *' f o f t ho oxcppiTisnC ] reflects on o v p r a
strategic effort". a c t n see f r o m the f inure that the
aooaness of a ^eci ?inn n «» a * s at socut 10 nieces of informa-
tion oer c 1 a • i n o ce^ioi ( t h i p t v •; i u t ^ 9 in the refprpncefl e x -
r°ri Ti?nr ) , Notice t -»•>» navina insufficient information seems
to n a v Q a norp a j v/ s f a c t (a s t e e o e r sl^r°) than the
?rloa r*e;1 s 1 fc •.. 5 t i n ' j s .
The iraon; in P i iures I I I - a ana 1 1 l - o both warrant s o ^ e
f u r t n e r discussion as t : t-nei p o r* i g i n . During a two year
pprioi beainnino in F e r u a r v of 1 Q 7 1 , a Purdue University
r^-r^arcn te^' co"1 'jc 1,0 -1 s a n i " ^ ^ * «<c?ri(r!pnts conce^ninn
r h a effects o * loai and relevance on decision rr a * i n g . This
1* o r « was done u n .1 p r c ? ° t r => c t to the Office of Pj a v a 1 Research
C C •"! R ) Cote U 5 2 . r h e lata u s e a r-« derive the curves for the
i r a d h s a a s t a ^ e n lurino interactions in the Tactical and
i' a i c t i a t i n 3 G a ^ e / where "individuals fill c o s i t i o n s of na-
tional a e c i s i o n m^^ers .-1 i t h p ° 3 o n 5 i K i 1 i t i e s f o r the mili-
tary* economic; intellioence anr negotiations functions of a
J
r ,f inn en a a oe d i n a I i m i t e T war." I ne o p a o h s may tentatively
t s considered */ a 1 i • f n p our i n * q ™ "' e H use si^ce tnev were
f a • 9 n under simulate -: if i n^s "> f military stress situations
t Ui :-'' «e are ^t^^i i nr; tn consiler in this study.











Information Load in Bits per 30 Minutes
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FIGURE Ill-a
*Taken from Relevance and Load: Effects on Simple and Complex
Decision Making by S. Streufert
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i.i i- s I [I-ai v i 1 l os the ' i r s t- t a i o r i r^f we will include in
t""1 ? construction of our c o t t a n d center resoonse model.
Since this 'carina factor is s t i b j e c t i v e r we '.--ill want to
generalize t h 3 3 u n j e c t s ' inputs. ' e c o l, 1 : 3 s k whether t ^
e
s ' 1 r i p c t s ") f t r 5 v 3 1 i o ? t i n are o v e r 1 o a o e a * > j n ^ e r I o a d e r "t / or
c t i m a 1 1 v loaded/ thereby j t i 1 i z i n a all three qiven coints
or Sfeuf°rf ' 5 q r s o h in Fioure 1 1 1 - a however, ha vino ex-
c c r i e n c e - d °c i ii on ~ ^ * 1 ^ i orccesses in the Meet, I feel
that t IP extra ^1 f jrnjt i s 1 i c h t 1 v v e r 1 o a ;ii n a or under'
I o a d i n a s h u 1 n a 1 s o o e available. For this* ^ a will ^ ev p to
interpolate two voc? noi its nn t H e : r a n h * between already
existing o i n t s . r h u s :ur validation subjects will be
presented with five choices of perceived loading lev/els*
guantftative values for these subjective feelings can be
f^«?n tro r ti10 a r an n . The load level* for the nuroose of
t ^ 1 s study* .* i 1 1 be strictly considered to b e whether the
c o t m a n d c?"if°r (.the blue "" r n r a n a e t e a m in ^ war oono) per-
ceives it i s overwo^keo* underworked* or working under an
n t i m a 1 1 o 3 o situation at the t i fr e the experimental input is
re "ju i red
.
8 . R E L E V ft • •) C Y
Inf ofTi?!; i o° relevancy is the next i t e m of irnportance
that we ^"'jl i an.'ress* and its i^cortdncp cannot t s- e un-
derestimated. '• considerable amount of irrelevant m 3 t ° r i a 1
is pulled in r > sensors or is r^^i o n rv inco^inq reports*
or sometimes is even pscui red by cutooinq rprerts. unce
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a a a i n * t h e c o rr ?> a n o ce^tsr h' Hen'na nfoc 2 ^ 1; hpcc'ps vital in
protect i no t h ° o e c i s i o n - = «• c r fro- too much irrelevant in-
formation * n i c i * o u 1 n boo nown ^r i e 1 a v h i s d e c i s i o n rr. a k i n q
o r o c e 3 3 . C f course r e 1 -3 v 3 n c v can o - :i> a n y t h i n a s to -*1 a n y oeo-
r I 5 3 t di f f ?r«?rt t i - - s . o f • c isc i si on rakers think or ^ a ^ <=>
decisions exactly alike. /» n a t one rr a v consider important
another may :-?eT extraneous. *^ oecision rr a k a r m a v focus on
op 3 cart ic j'ar o rod 1 em 'or a o^no i of time* making some
valuable information or another subject a pd e a r irrelevant at
t h e t i n». a for his nurnnses. ° .-; i 1 1 have to he sensitive to
t r i s c o n c e o t rTeSlcsninc! ?) n d v a 1 1 ~! a t i r -.} our rosnonse
ro r'e I .
To observe how informational relevancy affects the o e c i -
si on ^ak i no process* «<* car pxa^ine Fiaure III — b / a clot of
c^rc^nt of relevant information vers u s t ^ a Q G I for various
load levels C r e m e m b e r i n a that 10 is t h <=> optimal loan). ;'ve
can o b s e r v a t- *-> a h U 2 relevancy is a significant nrea< point*
wr-^re the optimal a n ^ underload situations b ^ n i n to improve
steadily* and ^ "> ? r e the overload situation reaches n o a < ef-
ficiency* f a l 1 i " o off farp^rer. .hi ! e 1 o q i c a 1 1 y all si fua-
tioos should improve as relevancy increases* the overloai
curve suoqests a possible breakdown 10 foe filter inc. process
wherehy if becomes increasinolv difficult t n 3 o r r out the
relevant material ^ u ' 5 n relevancy 00 e 3 b e v o n d arcut 40%.
T n i 3 a s o e c t o f i e c i ? o n m a k i n a will also b e 1 n c 1 u o e d in
our command center response ^ooiel. •'• ' j a i o f since rel^vancv














*Taken from Relevance and Load: Effects on Simple and Complex
Decision Making by S . Streufert
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i7-M to dp even * too ^uch di scarify between suojects'
r e s o o n 5 e s . f n p c r a o n in ~ i :u r e t [ r - ^ is d i v i 3 e d into 20% i n -
C ,s TentS( .i " in : r • •= ,- r -1 avoid snv interool at i on errors over
pilars that- - r r -• .. f s r - ' -. >»c?riT?nts d i a rot cover* i« e will
a ! ' o * only subjective i n c u t s o i v i s i b 1 e bv 20. I h i s will also
o i v e the CfTi-^r il i ?r>hcn of inputs that * e desire* This incut
4 i 1 1 re c o Ti o i n e d v i t h or! i^r i n o u t of loan 1 p v e I to enter
Fioure II- to ~> ? ^ ^ == a c ^ n s '- Q I ratine for the time the i n -
out is reouesteo. F r the ourooses of this study? we will
strictly c o n 3 i j« r r a r r. -> n t relevancy as that amount of all
t^'crT.jf io'1 oeion o r e s e n t <=» d to the incision maker that is
relevant to the f Vi < at h a n ci (localisation of a submarine
co ,itac t f reordering 3 convoy * ivoi iinq detection bv ooccsino
airborne search assets/ or '«;^t 3 ver particular evolution t n e
decision nr» a < e r 1 ; concernina h i t. s p 1 f * i t h at the f i rr e the
incut is reaui red).
C . DATA 4\/ATLAi-J[LlTY
A n o t h a r i-rcortaot factor in rif> decision ^aHrg process
is the availability of information (i°r? soeaki ng strictly
of relevant information) t o the incision qi a '< e r . Availability
o * information ^ ~ ? a couole of different concocts influenc-
i n o it. First t^°r-> is t h e accuracy of information. The ac-
curacy ' or sun-posed accuracv of information* c j n have a sig-
nificant effect on n u r c * n ^ n •>, center. .hen we discuss a c -
c u r a c v ^v itself* '« e o e c o m e i m m e r s e '1 in t h <= ouestion: ro*
accurate is accurate pnouch? "ihat ar* the effects of varying
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',<_., ro»s n <• accuracy on the ° ^ t o c t i v ? n a ? ? of the c o ^ !i a n d
center? hat h a c n e n s i 1 the information comes f roi a aues*
t i o n a h 1 e is o u r c e ?
hqw accurst 3 is ircunt? enouon? Let's te<e the example
c f C T H target ino of t h p i a v v ' s H a r oo o n ir i s s i 1 e • In a manual ,
unclassified t a ^ e of H a ro n on t-irnot ina con.iuctPd during Spd-
t e m b e r 1 ° 7 -? ^ y r K ~ author* it was ^o«n that a Irowledoe of
an onoonen 1, ' - o o s i t i o n H i " not al ways Guarantee successful
a *" r 3 c * . Oooonent's comt^ ano s n e
e
a * e r <=> needed for success*
ft.'
I taroetinu 9 t I onoer r a n o e s . IrMr^iMon on neutral shio-
oinq was necessary r -,> n r e \/ e n t undesired activation of f v?
missile's terminal h o m e r on the wrong shin, T h ° s e findinqs
were consistent with h =•=»»- exoerie'nce and show that "some
inf orinat ion"# without reaards to its accuracy/ may not be
sufficient to "? u i H e a successful operation. Accuracy errors
4
a mile or more can seriously j e oo a r d i z e u T 1 1 targeting
v a 1 i u i t y $ e s o e c i a 1 1 v since r^rooon is a "tire ani foraet"
w e a r o n ; there is no canadilitv to cirroct firing data after
1 a u n c h i n j
.
Does a "?rn°r r ^> s < qrouo need to antic irate attack
within the next week* t * i> next two >iavs/ or the next four
hours » or whpn? I"hp comouter and communications assets
available to us t ^, -< ?$v r ^ n p i v 3 us a great deal of HtpI y f
accurate* data if that ^ a t a is available, 'hat becomes of u ^
if that data is not available* or the use n r communications
of* co^cuters is ~i e n i e i us by a n adversary? How well a i I 1 w p
1 1 1 n c t i o n then?
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Lack of informal- ion ^ r res the c
o
ti n a n d enter to extra-
polite avai 1 ?.i I - infon )t i on t n m a k e reoui ren d e c i s i o n s > an d
t a n '• s to cut d o '' n o ~ the n j - ** ' e r r * non — reouirec decisions
i •> ^> . '<Q n is 3 c o r "> s a r w a t i v <=> ? n i i- a ] rv n a t u r e • and * i 1 -1 usu*
•ally f 3 i 1 to e x t r a c * J s r 1 1 c * C e r t ^ i n t y as rossirle f rcn
available i a t a » t r e r e c y comolicatino. t h i s situation. As in-
correct data i t e f" s enter the picture/ the Quality of deci-
sions being v. a o e will re i n h e r =» n t i y oearaded. Extraneous i n -
formation can I u^«i ^-^ j r * ipf^ro i* i t h a ^pc i si on m a k i n a pro-
cess,
\ n o t h e r important aspect- o t informational accuracy is
the nerceive"! ace uracv c * the source o * t h. a t information.
" hat ha opens if the source ^3 proved to be unreliable in
the oast? Dunna atior^l ."eek x X I T I in the Mediterranean
rftjrina t n <= s u m m e r of 1*77, the • > ^ c J ' jG E s i m u 1 a t e d f i r i n g
th r Pe Ha moon n- i q 5 i j o 5 ijn '^r the ii rpct i c n of the Li b 3 5 A fj A -
TO'"^ A # ^i h i c i was ict inn as SSSC f surface sub -surface coordi-
nator). 4 11 t h r ° e >r^oo n s w e r <=> o o o r I v targeted and were
ruled as misses. ' n a I" ** on - ' - ^ ~ a i e an entry into ^ i s ex*
excise Icj that s i n c e the c -' : [J : "^ •' o i d not neve an accurate
oicture of vat -as acini on in the exercise/ the .' <" u
F
,/ o u 1 d
no lom»r f i r a w ? a oo p s h a s e o solely on her directions. Lon<-
i n '•; oaCK at the introduction* we can s e <=> our STontn a n a ef-
ficient C 2 s y s t e " i c f »irn jeopardized r v source r e 1 i a b i 1 i -
tvr 3 completely i n t e r n a 1 1 v venerated problem.
ft n aaversarv has f r ? capability of i n^ ] uenc i nc the a c c u -
racy of information i« e c 'ir o a t h e r o n hit. !-•<=> can distort our
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concent- of v h a t is ^ c f u a ' I v t a < i n a ol ace hv cnvpr and i?cer<-
t i on tactics. -= can * 1 1 ? m o t to t h w a r t our s ° n s o r s n y j a m -
mi nq of i e S *" r* O y i n o t —
"
r
, ^ n ^ ; n f up 5 ^ -r g t h i n o w 1 t h our cot-
Tunicgt ions iiii ' =! t i t i n < 3 . u r own E ' C fi C e m m i s"i o o control"1
conditions can o* e p r i v e > 1 3 of aval 1 aole information. Or, the
other hand* our technoloaical a^vancps '.-/ill I i -n t the abili-
ty of the adversary to ja^1 us, and oy exoerience and train-
in; can limit his ability to i*c°i^ us. Fnysical damage
c a n- o e p e d u c e d hy har deni no our systems.
So a c c f " 3 ^ ^ center c a n b e j e n i e d 1 n * o r r a t i o n / or be
ai ven information t h a 1 1 s actually inaccurate or is r p r -
c 3 1 v e '1 to r ." inaccurate. F h s lecision maker m a v / by over*
s i :: h r or inexoe^ience/ not" o e a b I p to find the information
he nee is. All this affects h 1 s actual suool y of available
information. '" -> > should we i n c r o o r a f 3 t h i 5 into any system
t o 1 e 1 ? - n e x o e r i e n c e o o a - j t r r => n usually u a u a e how much
nore information he ne?ns to w p sure of a leci son. Tna accu-
racy of his information r- a v rnt , howPver» linearly affect
his decision orocesses. For examine/ a c o " T - 3 n d e r can o t v i -
u s 1 y o e 1 1 e r i u i o e a situation if he has 7 /e or the lata
t h an if ne h^s 5 "b ^ / out ..ill ^ i s iudqement oe twice as oooj?
Any mo'iel of a syste T should consi'i^r this a no perhaos exam-
ine 3 n exoonential curve as well/ and f h e n determine d u r i nq
-po-pI validation « h i c h reflects reality more accurately.
So data availability -< 1 1 1 be the third ana last major
variable t * a r we will nc'i"''1 in our r p s r o n s a model. '' e w i 1 1
a a 3 i n measure this factor as a subjective response of a sun-
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j e C t 1 n a 1 e c i S i o o T^kina r o 1 e • "-bile we st^^cfon to oen-
pr?li ?° t h = incuts o f ! o^^ ' e v e 1 and relevancy b y providing
-; ~ .-a f- of "can" r^sconses I » n l c n « .-. -*? r e in fact fairl
limited to by the * i j r a o h <? ) , i«i r*i t n i s response ,ve will
i ' 1 o /» ^ c f ^ 1 f roaHi-s j- .:a f -.«» e e n and 100%. Functional use of
the 'it-i availability v a r i a o 1 ? in tn° t. p ?• e I will o e linear
or* exoonent i ai as iis:uss j d earlier. For our study* we will
strictly ~ie f i n' data availability to o <° that amount of
relevant jata the ~ ^ c i s i o p t-upt h a s ^ v a i 1 a n I e to him c o m -
ci"e1 to w ^ a t he feels ^ -3 nogrjg tn be completely aware of
his current si tuat ior f i o a s he know the pn^iMon of all
pne^y units* «ihat is the status o + the last we an on fired at
a suhnarinp, arp his r a a a r s b e i n a a c t i v e 1 v j a m m e a # etc.").
C . SHOCK FACTO ?
fhe last i t e *n t^^r "-^n is to b a addressed in our discus-
sion of r « 'iron 5 ? to stress i s w h a t occurs when a command
r^ntpr %nd its ^eci 'ion ^ ^ < o r are " c a u q h t s K o r t- " , i.e. ar^
c^n'rpnfs'i by -< situation t H^ develops rapidly and for
*Mcn thev are unorecarej. Ip i ? situation must oe met with
} crisis TianaaeTent aooroac*"1 as o oo o s e d to the n o r nr> a 1 cj a nr,
e
o 1 a n * and i o v a r i ^ o 1 v culls available assets away from their
normal t a s i< s * -» e o r a 1 i n o e f fici on cv. fnis could be caused dv
successful d e c e o t i o n tactics b v the adversary or a breakdown
in the intelMcence svstemi as witnessed o y t h <-» fall of the
Shah of I r 3 p
.




ijr-=>r normal ooer^t ina conji t ions» it is purely the result
f t o t a 1 surrri s? jpo little or r o orecarat ion/ and will
tpwoorari 1 v 1 e t a *f a the co^^and c fl nt3r efficiency since some
normal functions t u s t o e out1 a s i i e ^ h i 1 e a response to a
newi unanMci oaten s i t a t i o n is ^enarateo. r h e imcact of such
a s h o c '< * a c t c r i ; currently undefined and i,nexclored» hut
should be incopocratel into snv stress rel atf H model.
Accordingly *• e shall e m o 1 o y our conceot of a shock fac-
tor into our m o o e 1 • [ •" will act as a time-limited degpada-
t ion of overall - j ' - ; .; i - - c v . T n i t i a I values will b e 10% 6 e -
",rTi^Mnn for a IS t i nij t e ce P i od » »i tn the c n s s i b i 1 i t y of
c ~ ^ n ; e s 3u p i n a the analysis cpocess. ^ n event c ao a b 1 e of
bringing on the " s it o c k factor" will be" defined for this
stuiy as one /^nicn is unexpected or unprepared for and that
lispupts the normal activities of Me command center* ( o e c i -
sion maker and "is st ^t M o v requi ri nq an immeoiatef
bootstrap resoonse.
r. '-inOEL t^TF.^ACrro S V.U CONSTRUCTION
riavinq i i s c u s s e i .• hat [ feel ar« fn» iTor^rt variables
t o o e included in our command center response m o d e
1
t it is
no v time to examine h o * the v a r i a n 1 <=> s should interact.
Since ^e are o e a 1 i n o w i t n subjective inputs* we m i g h t want
tn offer a choice of responses that can t>e eauated to a
f ' j r t h p r s ij cm - c t i i/ 3 incut. If a 3 k i n o * n p ouest ion, "On a
s c 1 1 e o * 1 to 1 1 how nas your o a v nocn?", you m i a h t evi vo ct
to a e t a reasonable r c- s o o r s e of an individual's subjective
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view o t how -; e 1 ' r or a f f ? c t i v e I v » ^n day has been ooi ng,
f h i s is the basis tor ^p final inout we w i 1 1 b e dealing
with" r n p i n 3 i v i "i u a 1 decision raker's out feeling of how
,
a
| 1 he f <=> e 1 s • i ; command center is functioning '.its e f f i ~
C i e n c v ) • ' e will =» 1 1 o w the leci sion n a '< => r the r a r g e of to
1 ' K .
"<le will o e ittemcting to relate the final incut of the
-T^cision maker's j jf i'ite a * his command center's efficiency
to s i s Drevious est
i
nates n * 1 o a d » relevancy and data a v a i ™
1 a n i 1 i t v in f h e next section. ' e want f o nave cur m o r 4 e 1 p s -
t
i
~ a t e of efficiency easily ccioarable to t n e decision
^ a - e r ' s overall a s r i " a t <= . H e n c e t w ° ^opri to nave our n- o d e 1 ' s
estimate c o m * c i i t in a range of •* 1 % • Th° first step here
is to seal-3 down the three major variables to a maximal in-
dividual value n f 3 n a Ctne^eby ensuring no numerical weight
a rl v a n f a a e of one variable over another). In order to allow
us to compare r^l u i v tf values a m o n o the three variables* we
should a <=; s i "? ^ sad variable a w e i a h t factor; where these
weight f acto r ? a; -1 ir to 1 i- . f h i s s n o u 1 • allow a r, a * i m u m
additive value n* tn? three variables m u 1 t i o 1 i eci ty their*
hpioht f a c t a r ^ of I '"> ( ' . T ^ p f^oc^ factor, a multiplicative
variable t K a t j f f e c t s the w n o 1 e orocess, should be m u 1 t i *
o 1 i e d dy the su n of the three ~ a j n r variable incuts (wren in
e f t e c t ) to rrr ]'i: j a final t n d e 1 estimate of pfficipney.
The t o i e 1 •• ill then a ° fed w i t n all the variable values
discussed earlier in the cneot er» c 1 u s the operational time
into t '> e war o a m e 3 1 m n i c h the n a t a was taken, to Generate
32

an outouf of name Mf Si m
o
'i e 1 lenerateo efficiency* and e s
-
t i ' a t e d efHciencv. r h e ^ a s i c outline o * t n i s model is i 1 -
I u ? " r a t e i i ^ p i • • .. ~ . I T I * c . T r <= ~ c ~ e 1 proora^ snoul d 3 1 s o a c ~
C 1 "• ij 1 a t «» c. * ~) r i -. tics r o ? v e r => "• e variance r- e t w a e n aerpra ,, p'i
?st i~^^.i ^j J r-> gn'i ? r ^ c o r 1 o f i n y i v i d u a 1 variances
for the production of a n a r nraon. This co^oleces our dis-
cussion of the n a s i c model.
F
. TEST E NV i -\' ; »": ' - ' cS
The o a t a i ' l o p col 1 (»rte H during furs of the w a r g a m e
.
r
_" b . '.' h S is a c o ~ c u t -1 r 3 r i v e n , interactive* multi-plaver
A^'^Te. The cl avers c Ari si ? f o * two c o o o s i n q t e a *" s (clue
a n cl r a n a e ) a n i >r\ j rr. o i r e or exercis'e supervisor. F a c n team
h?s a praphics d i s o 1 a v ?nrl a status n o a r n to monitor their
torres c^ ; contacts * i t •* . I n addition/ pacn team has the
anility to maneuver '^c^i >c f iv^t or deactivate sensors*
a n j to conduct" attacks u f i 1 i z i n a t o r c ^ * e a D O n s oy inputting
orders o ^ a c o n it a. n • t p r ~ i n -,i . f h p game can ne o i a v p a i* i t h
c < i , H n : , c a n n e j scenarios or players can o u i 1 d their own
scenario ^ataoases a t * h e investment n f t <* n $ of nan — hours.
F» v n u i 1 cJ i n q a Mt r =?e t h a o 1 a v e r s can define the caDabili"
ties of all spnsorsi w e a n o n s $ and olatforms* and can pick
the s t a r t i n a locations for the oor-osinq forces. Artificial
intellioence can r - irt reduced into the name via messages
from tha ° * e r c i s e supervisor to concerned si ops. Computer
algorithms rj e t e.r T i n .» the o u f c o m a o * sensor detections and




































start. I de a 1 1 v a tea 1 ' coisi -t 5; of t -> r e e to four olayers.
The s oe o i f i c scenario us?-1 f o p or lata collection will
r- => i c =* r n e b convov scenario. " ! u - will \ m e o i v e n five escort
vessels ( w i * '- • » s s i nei 2 s ~ i obo a r a h e 1 i c o r t e r ) -ir'i ^P A
Maritime 3 3 1 r o 1 s i r c r a f t 1 5 u or o r t to fake a c c n v o v of
twenty-two n; so" l'' :i 'i merchant vessels t n r o u g h c o n t e s t e o wa-
ters in e hot war. ' ' range forces will consist of two subma-
rines* o^e intelligence oatherioa shio» and ten long ra n ae
air reconnaissance -li r : r -, f r . Orange's a o a 1 will he to in-
flict as rri.c r ' 't'^i^ =) s o o s s i b 1 e on the Te r chent convoy*
h i 1 no a I • I I "e t- -> TiflXITiiZP the Survival ^f rr o r -
c h a n t shirs. Figure i r i - s •- o w s the oisoosition o f odposing
forces at name start* „i tn 6 1 u e forces transiting fron riaht
to left. Al" game start occos'ina forces have no contact with
each other, ,> i t" blue nun- onl v t-he int-el licence that
Grange forces a r e to t r-^ i r '-' <•* s t . Data .-ill re g a t h e r e n f r o m
t s a Hue command center.
G. DATA COLLECTION a DEDUCT I ON
H a v i n a copstructe-'i our ^ od e 1 * we n i u s t now undertake its
aoolication. [ n o r -. e r to " n this * e will use ex^prin-pntal
'"ate a a t h e r e d f r o t =i ? r r i ° 3 of * a r j a t e s using the ft E $ (war-
fare effectiveness simulator) in the C 5 Lab at t ^ e Naval
Postgraduate School. Data c o i 1 e c f i o n will ; j e done in three
forms. First, [nrou'if1 the i a t a collection t o r t shown in Fig-
ure 1 1 1 - e t r,e*t o v r" e a n s of a voice rec^Minq o * siinificant
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The b a f a c n I i - c t i o n f o n is d e s i o n e d to t a k e a n- i n i t ^ 1
=>*» r> i jn t of t i " ? a no >";rt to fill cut ^u p i no the actual pi av
r f fie "1V-. T t can r e * i i i = out ' v c *i s C U ^ r; thrp? blocks
an"; a1 p i t i n a a o v> n t r > r a e n^iher?. ^ a s t experience o v the a u -
tH )r in collection o f ? a t a in fleet exercises 'i a s shown that
the less complicate a 3 form i s> the -n o p e roeoi ly it will oe
u c ^n j u p i n a a n i o h concentration ° f f o p t on the rart of the
i n d i v i d u a 1 filling it out. F h a face recorder « i 1 1 be used
to n o t e significant averts i r' n -5rr}t i vp tor"' that the data
sheet w c u 1 n not account f o r C a s o p p o s e o to a narrative t v P e
] o ; h? in < e P t up). I h i s nappative c o u 1 d roint out
di scrsoancies in f o p rr entries later d u p i n q the analysis
rhaser or could ^ used to confirm that oat a. Data collecton
will h e suoePvised n v the author in ^ n effort to onsure so^e
conformity in the p a a s o n i n i o e h i n *. thp Ion e n t p i e s made.
I he objective or t ni ? a n a 1 v s i s effort will be to r.orre-
l a t e the inouts a f the fir^r f o u p sections of the data form
tc the last section/ t n a t of t-ne individual's Percent ion of
the efficie n'C * a is command center. This will involve a
quantitative analysis of subjective inputs. This self as-
sassTent- could o r o v i o e some mislead i no data* so c^s a oert of
the analysis w s tu s t examine Y L ' a data for any possibly r e ~
1 a t e o inconsistencies. r n a outout o f t t> e model will nive us
the ability f a d o s e p v e » i c n run of t h a data in t n r ^ » oif-
f o r e n t ways. ° * i 1 I a e t a printout * h i c h w i 1 1 enable us t n
build a a p a o h o ^ t^-t^^"1 versus estimated efficiencv ( ! u r -
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i n a each run. \ e <•; i 1 I a) so a e t a orintout of the avoraas
- i f f e p e n c p bp'iwg^n the i?nor^t?ri a n d estimated efficiencies
for e =« c h p > j n . I. -^ r 1 y .- •-• -will o e able * n construct a b a r
3 p a o n s h o n i n o in '•£ 1 <> r ' " ? r r s fip difference between tip
T-?"el aeneratei ?ffici? r cips and t r> o subject estimated nnos,
The^t are several i/ori a&l ps within the model tnat allow
us to manic u late t f e data. ih» crimary m e t h o -.3 of manipula-
tion will o e in chancim f « p resoective w e i q n t s of the input
variables of H > t, relevancy* a n ^ data availabillity. •'< e
c ^ n adjust M'^--»i i .-• factors w i f t the s^ock factor. ie
can e v o 1 o r o 1 i ^ *a a r a n exronential effects c * n ^t,i a v a i 1 a ~
oilitv. :*i e cannot ° * r .- c r different e c i s i o n makers ' results
to be the s a m e in all c^ses. For t -h a t m a 1 1 e r , their basic
in outs may vary also. *;e should be aware of a learning
cupve/ since lata will n e ??f v^i on consecutive oanes.
f- rn T t K e results of this mal ysi 3» we should be a r I e to draw
s o : t e conclusions a 3 to w h » r p the jecision* m ^ < <=> p 3 in the e x -
Deriment plgce their SToHasis t^n^n raHncj decisions* i.e.
what factors of t n o 3 e we ^ => v ° examined are most critical to
them.
This r>vt n r has served t n construct a t o d p 1 that will
reflect which of t h e 1 i s c u s s e b v a r i a b 1 e s (loadr relevancv
an* i a t a availability) a r ? most i^oopt^pr o top decision
t a < p r s in oup exoeriment. n » x t chaoter -.ill discuss tie
lata collect-'''' ^ n d »- -1 o anal vsi s nf that ~ a t a in the content
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in this chanter . 1 1 ! j^a! vze t^e d a t a oathered from
t r •"• E S ") =3 ' " in t - r . - ii f f?rent contexts. k« e firs* want to
pvaiiine the r a * ? a t a . / : j r i n o t h » examination we will be
I o o k i n a for any inconsistencies that miciht indicate that the
data is 1 nn I i i for our intended use/ doing a analysis of
the v a r i a o 1 e s 3 l 1 o a d » relevancy and data a v a i 1 a b i 1 i t y . ;• e
Aill accoTol i sh this by craohinj out t-hp data v s t i nu e #
ooint inn to 3 n > envious differences in the r:af a> sno o i s -
cussing Niat reasons n-jinf e x o 1 a i n t n <=> differences.
ft s vci: m a v recall t r
o
t the last chaoter* we wanted to
eH^me two variations within our model. Firstly/ we wanted
to see if 3 a t a avai 'anility had Tore of a linear or exponen-
t i ^ 1 effect n n our s u fr i e c t ' s oerceived co'^a^i center pf f i -
c i a n c v . Me were n 1 s o concerned with how the extrapolation of
two ^f ra points on the h^ 1 c u r v e m i a h t affect our results.
This clarification ni variations ".ill n e the focus of th°
s jcon1 o o r t i o n of t h i ; chaoter. K' ? r^ we will use as an
^ n a 1 v s i s t oo I ' t K e s t a n d e r d ieviafion between the m o d e 1 o e n ~
e r a t e d e t f i c i ° n c v * n d the subject's d e r c e i v e d connfiand center
efficiency. J r ° basic c^ n r or, f herp is that the s m a 1 1 e r the
standard deviation, t n e tetter the ti a t c h t pf hee^ the
subject's estimate of his c o v n- a n d center's efficiency and
f h e t o o" ° 1 ' s oenerate' 1 ? s r i ~ -° * p over the c o u r s e of tfp p arr e
(data collection period). r h . «• final section of •'his chapter
will deal with t h e analysis of our data* attend" in a to
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determine whether there are any consistent oatterns among
the variables of the model that could be oract ical 1 y signi-
ficant. Once again using the root mean sauared difference
between the s u D j e c t ' s and the model's efficiency estimates
as an ana lysis tool.
A. EXAMINATION OF THE DATA
This analysis of the raw data will be easier to under-
stand if we first exolain the sequence of events that takes
Dlace in the WES scenario. The game can essentially be bro-
ken down into six definite time periods or phases. In Phase
I the subjects (Blue commanders) establish the rules of sen-
sor user and the rules of engagement; these are the initial
incuts. In Phase II Blue makes inital contact with the
Orange forces and Blue begins the localization orocess. In
Phase III Orange air assets arrive and Blue's airborne A S vJ
caoability is destroyed. In Phase IV preliminary attacks
are made by Blue on Orange submarine units. In Phase V
Orange Missiles attack Blue surface forces. Phase VI sees
the destruction of ooth Oranoe submarines, and Blue prepares
for attacks on the Oranqe surface unit.
Lookina at Figure lV-a» a Dlot of the four subject's
perceived loading levels throuahout the qame* we see some
baseline disoarities that we miaht expect within a group of
decision makers. However/ there sre three definite trends
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towards t ho -^ n d o * L " n g s e 1 o f t h rj q a m e , o v wn i ch t i ** e t o s t
p O e p g hav? r e e n na5S?d o u r a n d a s ^i; contact w i t r ort-nsinq
forces has no*" c?en « a o e • ^ n the i n t i a 1 contact 0^350 the
lorfH I supI s o?nin t o i n c r e a s 5 aid r ° ~ ^ i n h i -o h until t h a end
o f P n a s e v . Ihpp; i 3 3 o m e tend.a icv * c r t h e loan to 'iron a o w n
at r he e n o o f each n r. a s e of t n e o a 1 1 1 e * t hu n rising for" the
n <=» x t s f2 r i p ^ nf encounters. After D h a s e V load levels all re-
ro-o f-Q 1 r) , levels*
These results all t e n -i to nM ect a o o u t r h n s a ^ <=» concept
0' ^ow the o e n e r a 1 5 c j
r
? f i c went; i n i r i a 1 ' v loon love's ^<tp
r i oh while h an ci i n n our n r I •» - s , r^->n t h e levels d roooed n f f
>, h i 1 e Blue i ^ uttorot inn to mr -i-> laf 3 on activities c f f hp
orcosina forces. Loan levels increased anain after contact/
a ng remained fairly hi.oh iuring the nrocess of localization
3 n .1 destruction of the o^ r"osm'! force. After the ooposing
f r c e was neutralized* the load levels went rack down.
•- o v i n o no, I e t ' s I oo^ at F i ou re I V -b * a d I o t o f the
s u o j" e c t ' s perceived informational relevancv v s,, time. Note
that relevancv was never oerc°i veri to n e less toon 60%.
Relevancv s??"1 ? t o h ^v/"' t^^r t»o rr^c<3. One track tends to
r o r g i o at or near 100^ t h<r o ' J o h o u t the course of the qa^p.
F h e oth^r t r a c < s^^ts at a lower 1 e v ° 1 ^r^a reflects a
further 1 c w e r i n o d u r 1 n o ^ h 3 s e s I T - V # those mnpre contacts
a n c o -7' r a t a r j o c c u r r i n - j . The r i -3 h rj e a r e e of relevancy re*
fleeted t h r n u a h o u t couH he explained r v the d a t a environ-
m e n t . In t *"» e c o t o u t e r 1 r i v e n w i r q a m e # n^r r u c h oata exists
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of lowpr ^I'Mrmcv c ou 1 ! Have been caused by a (decision
maker's conc^ntrat- im his "intal pf forts op a small oortion
of t h 9 tactical situation nut still bei no e x o o s e o to i n f o r -
t s t* i o n c o n c ? r n i n -. r - - v o r a 1 ! situation.
'j'ow let's ? v g t i n e t i :.* u r e I v - c » -t clot of c e r c e i v e d data
» v a i 1 a c i 1 i t v s. t i rr= e - In this riot we see three fairly
consistent «* e t s n f lata ^ ^ i on ^ set" whose baseline is fat
h-»r than tne others. r o i s 1 o * e r n a s e M n e o 1 o t shows an ex-
a one r a t ed increase as t i t e ones on — an increase that is
t= i n i m a 1 in the other t h r « <=> sets of ri a t a . This lower set of
lata '.«.< i 1 1 have t o oe c o n s i ^ r .=> j « h e n p * a t. i n i n o the data o u t -
rut of the r.ri^i in the lest section of this charter, since
it is so low that it may not he totally explainable as a
difference in decision r- ^ <- 1 no styles.
L a ^ t 1 v / w e s n n j 1 •.- lnn<. ^t f inure I V - a t a o I o t o f per-
ceived cc nT (3nj center efficiency v s . time. f • o t e aaain that
th^re is o n e low n a s e 1 i n ? o 1 o t at the beginnia (not f re -" the
s^-rt i^ta set as the 1 o * o a s e 1 i n e nl of referred to in the
la^* oaraorgoh). f h e overall o e n e r a 1 trend of the orach is
that the co^t^ -1 center ?' f ' c i ^^cv is degraded during cnn-
tact and coir.oat » and that as combats are resolved* the effi-
ciency rises. It is possible that the low baseline clot may
be traced to the subject's f iis H in that the initial distri-
bution of o r vrs a n o miles <^ * engagement involved f o c 'nucn
pMort and detnacteo f r o " t u <-> c o ^ m a n a center's ability to
function. I 1! i ; ' o w ^a 5;? 1 in^ should n e < e o t in mind as a e ex-
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o* this chaotfr t n ?> , 3 r .
inOEL ' [ ' : .
lie lata «h=pp r u r thronah four versions of cur model.
The first version ot the rntiel was as discussed in the last
c^:irter (linear :i a t a availability function). The seccna v e r -
s i t n /< a s ^i f temnf in t ;i a * the data availability function
was exoonpnt ial instead o * linear/ f^t i s to say that hav-
i n j 50% i a t 3 » . -. i 1 - r. i ? i * / c r e i * ° * in the >to oe 1 a n effective -
": j '^ value c * / 5 ." » 3 r ~ o en iown an exponential c u r v ° . A
thin version of r n e "™ o e 1 consisted of entering the
rplevmrv ^aor, qrouCinq the h i q h sno very high responses
together instead of aroucina the ootimuro/ highland low
resoonses together. T u -> last version consisted of a c^^bina—
t i o n of the second * n ~j t ni rd ve r sions. The reason these ver-
sions were out toaethpr «3s to ^ 1 1 e m o t a sensitivity
anal vsi s of t h e s *= I'-rsions in an effort to detepmine which
version was actually c I o s e r to no.-' the subjects functioned.
In order to fetermine s 1 1 c h v e r.s i o n of tie model/ if
erv, was consistently closer to the » a v the subjects func-
tioned/ we n « e • ; to establish some measure of fit between t n o
rn o J e 1 oener?. tei efficiencies an-: r n o subject's estimates.
For this purpose I c h o o s e to t a * ° rhe s t a n o a r deviation
^etws?n the s u o j e c t ' s estimates ^n 1 t -i ^ model oenerated ef-
ficiencies for t - 3 r! u r a t- i o n o f each j one. Since 1 was ioim
e factor analysis which required 36 runs o f the data through
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r h o ti o fi e 1 per i a t a seN I could then c o n s t r i j c t a oraph of
incre^sinn 5 r a n -< = r 3 ;evi-itions for e a c r' data s ^ t run t h r o 1 j o h
» a c h version of he ^ c c 0? I • r ranked pic qrouo o * 3 n runs
lowsst r -i h i 1 n e .j t s t -• ' ' -. r , i^vi v i on and ira^pp'i then.




j p e n c e o f t h 2 r'our sets o f i a t a when run rhrouah each
t>o oe 1 • r h e curves of r n e linear end exponential o a t a availa-
bility furcMors ijv j c?p>i"i °r :irl v lower standard oeviations
t h a n t- n e c u r v •» s r e o p e sent i 10 the involvement o ^ the int°r-
o ^ 1 ,i r o a h i o ti 1 o e n mo ' o •>! 1 o a J functions that a r •=> used to
enter the relev mc\ : n a o h n f c i ji.p ' [ 1 1 -o . 'ou r p c 3 1 I that
v 1 e added two a x t r a c o i n t s to the a r a o h in F i a u r e [ 1 1 - a •
Since t r e ~ e were °o corresponding lines of information in
F i qu r e [11-0/ it w e 3 necessary to see whether utilizing the
h i oher v a 1 u e
v
i e n t r v lines ° n t K a lower value e n t r v lines was
t- o r e in line ,: i r " reality =' te'% onservina t n e results o * the
experiment. r -^ 1 ~ s i 1 n i f i e s t h a t » for one set of < 1 a t a ^ the
first o r s e c o n 1 /ersions of the t o d e 1 are post nearly in
line with t K e suoject's r^sn^ns^s. The o ^ n e r sets of oata
showed this same * r a n '-i , o n 1 v to 3 lesser d e o r e e •
B y d o i n o this sensitivity analysis on the m o d e 1 » d r i v i n
q
the stand a rn deviation iown o v e * a m i n i n q the effects of
c h a n g i n a s o m 5 inner functions of the model* we can no* say
that the results m .-, f v ^ ^rs interestea in should d r o o ab 1 v
q rs T p f r o m one of tn? H rst two versions of toe m o o e 1 • The
n « < t- s e c t i o n of * r :i ^ c h 3c t » r will leal with what t h e date
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Havinq 1 e t ^ r ti i n e o th^t two of t N 3 versions n f t It? Todel
rr a y scpI y to t i e "°sifl ts of r h e t o o e 1 nuns* we no w want to
see exact ! v .-.*• in > r -r a r i o o «> e couH derive from the t nose
results. ? process ^ t anal ysi s will be to first order
e 3 C h data set run by standard levi -it ion, . « * i l 1 o 1 o t the
results ac^ior nut this tire we will olot the relative
weiqhts assicinei e a c r- c r i t 3 r y / 3 r i a o 1 e of the "n o d e 1 ( 1 o a d $
relevancy/ an 1 J a t a 5 v a i 1 3 o i 1 i t v ) vs. the oroer o * the run
by standard ;p»/i at in. mat ' e -nolo h oc e to find in our
-i p -> ^ h «; i? a c o t r o n r = c r - p t h a t will t = 1 1 us somethinq about
the subject's cerceotion of behavior in the environment in
',
K
i c n the rJ a t a .^ a ~ ^a'^^.
F i a u r e [ V - f is c^arac'' ;, ri «t i c o * the aooearance of ell
these aracHs. ; 9 see I o a i level h a v i n o the ^eav i est w e i q h t
=3 1 t n e lowest s t -a r> 1 a r .i i e v i a t i o n / with relevancy am o a t a
availabilitv at r - -. I c w -^ c t o o i n t . ^ s we move nac^ in the
cr-'er, we s e J that t n p w e i j h t 3 f t n e Man factor loor^asps
as the relevancy factor i n c r ;? a 3 a s r the data availability
r e r a 1 n 1 n o constant 1 v 1c •• . > ^ 1 <; interaction ,v 3 ? common for
a ' i plots i n that the i a t a availability always started at
the lowest 00 i n t ani nove.i ud slowly as load and relevancy
interacted. Load a n o relevancy were almost eau a 1 1 y divided
a g the i m o O r t a n t *•--< r r ( h i j h e S t weight) of all the runs.
r h a t would lea*1 us t t u e conclusion tnat the amount of 1 a t a
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V.-C t i n a ^i^ thai" tn? cit correlation mas accrue a (s^dl lest
standard a e v i a t i o n 1 hpn load «.' a s w e i a h t e d heaviest* w e can
< - a ^ t-no co^c 1 i.isi'on r - .. • • -> ? suh ject ' s assessment ..as almost
entirely d r i 1/ ; r s n y - 1 ~ 1 a "i i n o .
1 1 j t i ? f h i s conclusion >, ^ H 4 jr j o r o a e r sensei or have
the results r a *» n r i is?'' 10 some fashion? r^? * a c t that the
data availability variable c ot?s out as being least inoor-
t a n t f our three t 3 j o r variables leads us to re-examine the
data taking environment* n a m e 1 v the " E 3 a a m e • A closer look
at t h^ 1 a ~* i^v i roniie^t a n i the t ,-» t « i ndi ca r ^s that there is
c o n s i o e r ^ - i y more ' 1 - T - au a i I ah I e r o t n a dec i son m a < e r t h a
n
I-. p o I - 1 t: e exnecteiJ in a real c o m .t a n i center in tactical
roarationsr and the c'.^e :^d m tv of t^e data chvsical 1 v
ro the decision ^ a < ^ r tends to + urtv?r e^anerate this a v a i -
laoi 1 itVi li'? : e n «» r u 3 lata availability was d r o d e r 1 y
scot I
i
anted y tt>e p o d ? 1 , so " c can m a < a s c m a statement to
the effect that t K a m. o • i e 1 lid 3 1 least function .veil e^ouih
to c i c < 1 j o the correct v e i o h t i n a factor o f the o a t a availa-
bility in cj r an a 1 v s i S
.
F r c m the analysis ? t the data « e 1 a v ^ been able to a c ~
r^^olish three things. e h a v ° conducted a sen^itivitv
analysis to ietermina no n f n adjust m o oe 1 functions to OD-
t i t a 1 1 y reflect tit sunject ' s self assessments of the cort-
T a n
.
J centor situation. \ e have then been able to • i e r e r m i n a ,
« i t h i n the test a n v i •* n m e n t » .. • 1 c 1 vari aoles in the model
^ a r e most crucial a n n 1 ° a s t crucial to t n a 1 e c i s i c n makinr)




h a v p se^n the neeH f oi" a n e -w source 3* 'est data to •further
invest ioat° t*i a area ~ f h, i^3n factors via * a c t o r a n a 1 v s i s »
r :o lit 7m.; r - -. •• .• . can n a < a ni b r o a "1 s c a t a m e r t s based on
the ia t a m-.i iou^cp • ' isp"1 i r ' t '->. i 3 stu iv. f n e concept of
the ^rc* f -i c t" 3 r / < h j c n % e a ! 9 o w a n t e d to invest io3te» r e ~





v ; f p. i 1 1 T c; a ) r c r ;-.
In c 1 o s i r" ~ t^is --.-/ of r« u t a r < ,> r. t o r s i n a command
center ;pviro« T ?pt i - < - .- i r j 5 essential that •* e d i s c u s s
t r. r p e '"^jrr areas r K ^> t h 3 v ?. influenced the initiation/ pro*
t n ~ s s r a f^ results of the stu.iv. e want to first discuss
?c n ie of ti fl o r o 1 e m 3 of i=il in i 4 i t h a touic of iiu^on
behavior. ' : e x t * a examine the t e s t e d from .-j h i c h t n e data
C a -" e / psreci jl 1 ,- ? i or.> t h -» t t°-;',,' o l is newly installed at
t h t 'a v a 1
O o3t~;radu?te School. Lastly we discuss the m o t i v a -
t i o n l r the o r o j e c t ^ n .1 octhpr it lived ud to exoecta*
t ions.
•i
. PITFALLS OF rtiJ-'wiM FftCmsS !<ESF A'"-?CH
Sny r e s e a f* c ^ none involving h u ^ a n factors is suscectible
to some potential o i r f e H s t n a t n e e 1 to be o 1 a n n ^ rj ground or
compensated fo p . 'j n e n y n u t a < e ^ a t a f r o m a 3 r o u o of iniivi-
d u 3
1
s t i o u t u 3 1 o e sure that t h ? y are 3 s nofO'^noous or
h^t<=ro "lentous 3 s i S ['•= -iji r> 1 h y the research y c u are a t -
t e ' r t im to 1 c . t •"> t*= case o f this t h e s i s I r e a u i r e d a
homogeneous arcuo .; f Mel"1 ^Koeri ?nc n i military officers. My
suojects in t r i ~ c^ 3 << ° r = ^1 1 ) - 3 ' s with 4 - b years of f i ° 1 i
o.^orienc? in coeratiooal nil lets. Since the Dart icio ants
„ e r o rr a ^ i o 3 te c i s i o n 3 i n 5 w a r a a m i n o environment/ the fact
{• h a t 1 q c i s i ~ ° Takop? all e < h i n i t different "rental orocesses
in accordance <i th r^ji r o e r s o n a 1 traits and experience was
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considered .ihen t -* e ' 1 1 => -ms evaluated %n>1 analyzed. The
a^i/irinr^or in .. u i - ~ -> n v i a t a is "3 3 1 n e r e d c h n h a v e a oe f i n -
i
f
i n f 1 ue n c^ 3 n t *» a t ; •? t a • 1 b a :invi roT" jn t for the data is
' scuss ed 1
1
J re. ?
-•• i i f n o next 5 s
c
r
i r- n on ; t S a s a u a t a
[here are two ^or? i inortant o i t f a 1 1 s * h i c h m a v h a v <* ad-
versely affect.3 "^ this study. 1^ first ' s the utilization of
self-assesSTnpnt as a oortion of t h e -lata collection. It is
possible t^.u t n i s could jenerat 1? s o -"n e 3annerousl y mislead-
i"~" lata for individuals. In order to facilitate ^^^ct 1c1
o f this d r o h I e *? an in a ~ a f f o r t to "~ i ~ i ~ i <? e any oofential
p' *3C r 5 it '^ij^' n 9 v e r I a " o 1 o v e ci the assessments of several
inii viaual s in the rest 'a r' e i n ^ t ^ a i "of a^v sin ale individu-
a 1 . "'v o r a n h i n n out f ^ e r a < n a t a I could look for anv inenn-
s i s t e n c i m s wnicn would indicate that trip self~assessfnent was
i o r o b 1 e ^ i n i C t n i 5 o r o o 1 e ti oi 1 not a or; ear). Tne
o t n> r pitfall is that o + atte^otino r o utilize totally sub"
j e c t i v e response 1? f r o rr oa^ticioanfs*' co^oan'nq o r> e set of
personal evaluations « i t n ^ ^ overall oersonal evaluation to
HC-ieve quantitative results, r
o
r confidence in the results*
a careful selection n f objective nuantitative measures
should be s o u a h t , to correlate objective data with s u b j e c -
t i v e evaluation. For ^x^^cl ?» data r p 1 e v a r> c v could no or -
t a i n e d by count im t- h p data o r o v i d e d to the s 1 1 c j e c t as a i -
ti9r relevant or irrelevant.
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,iEs -5 - n h ' scjucre
(he BxopriTpnf ^1
a convov S " - ' ^ ~ i c i. j 3 i
.; ^ 5 raton f p n 71 n .i f't' ici[? n ^3 p | 3 y -
t- h o - - crooraf <a t t n e C 5 L a b at
t;
h p ^val : os f J r'i ,'u^i, f! .S c " d o ! t [•'•> i ^ * 3 gathered r^re is
subject to ooisi'jl.' Hss because of t h e environment f r o ^
v^ic^ if was t a < e n . Let'?? t =? * e a cl os j loo* at t h e name i t-
?°l f an-i its 3 o o d a n i bad ooi"ts» and cmsi ler t n?i r i*espeC"
five impacts ~ n the i a 1 a *
r h e c a m « is ol aveo in 3 secure 1 a 1 v> . This Ian is c a o a b I e
> * being 1 i v i "^ e n u •? ir>t n three smaller areas* or command
centers f t* I u e » r a n - - , a - , i m c i r <* ) . Each area has one color
n r a o h i C s d i s o 1 a y usn'. svubolooy similar to an f-j T S cresen-
t a t i o n . r h e t e c ^ s can c h a n a e the scale o f their oisolays as
«eH as select which items (ai r-sufface-subsurface-
tri-}n')!v*? nj 'v" n »;i i'' r:il-nr ^r>v combination thereof) t^ev
- e s i r e t n h 3 ./ <=. 1 i s o 1 a v e :i . In addition to the graphics
li snlav» each area ha? an r 1 a r i ^ 1 j t C & T and ^ status board
C ~ 1 fro*" w h i c n information can ^^» oueried. t h e r stations
2 r e available i n each a r p =* r o utilize decision aids if
available a n 1 1 e s i r e d • r n e name itself is time variable from
peal time to 1 / o t h r^.^! m-p. Information/ interactions
between u n i r s * and i i s o 1 a v s 3 f e j^nerated in one cia i, e ^ i n 1 j t e
intervals. L 1 * -; - I i < a t i t> e delays for order resoones are
built info the o r o r a t / a 1 n a with eouioment failures based
on r n e mean time between * a i 1 '. ' r e s listed in the cj ,} ^ e ' s -i a t a ~
base. Ine 1 a <" a b a s *» can r° that ^ + a previously run/ canned
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scenario* ^ r fhp ' ; s =« r c a n r; r -1 -i r » * i <s own scenario enU n a f a -
h s - e (at r '-> ^ => x ^ e n s a o * n ?nv t ?n 3 o * '« 3n -h ou P S )
r t-, o p p 1 - ; • > - , , , - , - viyintaopg r o u s i n g t h e » t S n a ft a
col I p c t i c n n • ! -i t .3 . ^ j ncs if is run in 1 secure "* o d e *
r'-issi M^'ii reel 1 -i £ •> databases can o e used by participants*
r* -> <. i n o the evolution m o •* e realistic, r h e game is computer
d p i v e n » so t " e need f <~> r excessive amounts of manual umpiring
a
n
'i battle < a m a oj ° assessment ?Jisaopears.The program has the
advert ised c a p a c i 1 i t v o * review i no t n e g a m e with Graphics as
i f was o' ayp i hv s a v i n i the : a " a o ^ r a c a . !e« technology o f
sensors r . a a p o n s can r e a a i 1 v n e created in the database*
a n rj new "or; 5m * 1 ~ <^ c a n tre utilized in the cn^ !"ani areas
t n evaluate t •"> e i p usefulness to the rl e c i 5 i o n makers,
« ff. S "Joes have several limitations as a research tool for
a d p o j e c t like o < i p s . f h e f i f?t is rn» current lack of real-
istic* of f "the-snpl f scenarios. The force capability o a p a m e •
t e p s 3^ not BCCurat?, and* i^nnrtant lyi force composition
?1* a v s favors the 3 1 u e s i "5 e . 1 n o 1 1» e p ^ea<nass is t n a t all
communications a r e n o n a t h p o u ci * c n a CRT t?r-njnal , so th?r°
i s n 1 h i n a available to simulate fro letPi^ental effects c f
multiple lines of communications (confusion* redundant op
conflicting reports), fna amount of lata available to the
olav^rs appears fa be r. o r * t^-»^ would op consi riered p e a 1 i s -
t ic ; and it is certainly m o p *• centralized and easily attain -
able t n a n w n u 1 d 1 e n e p a 1 ' v re t n e case in a tactical environ -
t. e n t • The cpessupe ^ * a tactical pnvi roniipnt does not exist.
These factors > ' I combine to n l nio^r'1 sore of the pressure
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nut on an actual c o
m
t a n d center. This is a significant proo-
l c. T since it m a < e 5 t h e concert o f reliance on ,\ E S as a sole
^"^ source for t i "* e n r *• o r * 1 o a 1 constrained experimentation
j 1 1 ist ionabl e.
\ s i J e t r o 'p the ^itp's characteristic limitations/ there
are other cror I ^^s to o e encountered i n this n e v. facility c f
simulation techniques. '.
!
i t h a n v new t e s t D e d 1 i < e the C ^ L a b t
tfirT? a^e growing o a i n s . It >~ a s t a * e n t i m e to resolve inter-
t ^c a problems n e t w e p o t ^ e "• p S Lac a n o tip host a a m e cowput -
p r s . Hardware orot. 1 e T 3 3 t the Host computers K a v a caused
o 1 anned ex op r i f^i t a f i nn ** o n e cancelled. Little or no coor-
31 nation between w ~> -; - mo users has been e v i i e n t when c r y d t o
card removals are c « -•cij 1' - -. ' c s *" host co^nufers ^. r p net ce"
cable of runnina more than one '• t S a a m e at a time/ and un-
scheduled e 1 1 r i j •; i n r o the system tend tn slow the na^e down
intolerably. rre-e^ct inn n y n i mer authority can monopolize
the ^nst computer for periods of up tn a wpp*. h o
a
1 ever/
better scheiulino jni coordination will eventually evolve
info a more r a 1 i a b < a system* or so it is hoped.
C. IMPOPTAWCF OF H'JVAN FACTORS IN C<£
The human i?ct:r; i m o a c * on a C 2 system is cn p n't the
least discussed and invest- ioated areas in the field. The
n r a d u a t e level ;v •" o i r 3 ~ s t fnp » .; a I ^ostoraduate School is a
mixture of technical courses with the addition of some Na-
tional 3 e c u r i t v Affairs courses. T n rt only i n s i o h t nto human
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factors was o n t a i n f» a iiiri ni our studv o + c n t o i j f e r oraohics^
«hera we I esme^ * o w to - p < - araohi cs tots ^t r r^ct i ve and
o 1 e a 3 i n a f n * ' ; ~ ! i - 3 n eve. ; ' ^c 11 t h ° curricu'uT w a s oener^t-
p d ^ i t h t h a a^vi '? a " • (— n .; .- -1 1 n f the best1 r. £ i i n s in t n e
nat i o^f it is safe t c s ^> v t r * a * f " 3 v a r ^ more c n n c a r n a o with
the tecnnic-jl ascects c 1 * tne * i e l d . *j h a t I find annoying
about this is that =;inc-; a TP sysf^"" is designed arounn" a
decision rr a W e r ( r ^ a -j u u m ^ n n e i n q ) , It as a araouate level
excert in the f i e 1 n » nave ! i 1 1- 1 e or nn concent outsine of
f 1 a e t tactical experience o * h n w a human in the system .Jill
re^c' in various s i t i =• i ") r" s .
r n i s thesis .as u n ,- j e r t a k e n in m a 1 1 a mo t to observe ano
a n ^ 1 v z e how s: p e h u ^ an operators actually behaved in a c o m -
ran"1 center (an ^ r e ^ in w h i c K T h 3 o so'? e*ceriencp).
''
; 1 t ^ o ' j "! h there » a n ? several r^f^rence sources available (see
bioliopraohy)* r -> ° > «*ra for* rr« ^ o s t o a r t vaguer qeneral >
a n o as a w n o 1 e not v e r v instructive. s v t a * i n a Graphically
oor*t rayed a n i experimental lv related information on 1 o a u i n q
a n o relevancv a n d c o ^ i n i n q t h e ^ with my o^n conceots of
m r a availaolitv/ I s ° t u o a n a 1 q o r i t n m to analyze t h e s e
three n-a jor variables. » 1 t h o u o n the Tata source was not
comcrehensive (as d i s c u s s a d in ' t S 3 s a data source) I nro-
f i i- e i f r
o
t the a:i m i t teol v i n c o n o I e t e a n 1 o r p 1 i t. i n 3 r v s 1 1 j 1 v
o ^ h ut a n reactions t n a t h a s been oescrioed here.
n ij t a n f a c t o r s research 1 n tne C 2 context n e e t s to be
pursued w i t n < r ' <^ r a vioor. U t h o u q h *> ° is not as glamorous as
creatine new hardware f ^r C ?. architecture* the ran-in-rne-
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I o o o s h o u ' c nor 2 e overloo*en. Consideri no hufran n e e o s a n H
f r^ j 'ties c o ' J 1 1 5 a v e n?, > ,n v i' 3 ',".3c h '3 s and rlol 1 ars in fip 1 o n q
run. It is i • r- o o r t a n t •" o i, pt?c;!, ?p t n j •» l ) the communications
• p - i c - 1 s » ni sol , -- - • thai- i rit:e', t,ices/ olus various deci-
sion ^ i 1 s ar? t i n 3 I 1 v in tn? service of a human aecision
T^"=>r « i t h h u ti a n capacities and ^^".m ' r a 1 I M « -, .
D . 5! 1 '•' AR y
|" h i s t ! j ; i ] h g s )t f prot?"i *" c rrovi vifl S O m e i n s i q h t s into
^
-
_ h u rr a n * a c t n r s t -, ,i t 3 h o u 1 *~ ^ c o n s i <i e r e d when oi scussi nq
a C. 2. system. ii onq fh^se line? </ e li scussed 3 general ^ o d e 1
f ^ r a C? svst"?^. --* tha-, =x= r ino 1 t^e h u m a n variables of
1 o a d f relav = ^cv/ and data availability and how they function
i n n i v i o u a 1 1 v i n t n 2 h u t a n n e c i s i o n process. Our next s t eo
, a s to de v e 1 o n an aljorithi" * i t h w h i c n we could o e r f o rm a
f •ac^?'" analysis > n t :-> e a f o r *> TenMoned variables to deter"
nine if there was any set o a 1 1 e r n used ov oecision >n a < e r s
within these variables.
r h e 1 3 t => o a * n e r e d "H "1 o ^ e s e n t <=> discernaole r ~ a r f ° r n .%• h e n
out t h r o u a r, the aloonith-r. However^ because of t h e envirnn-
ment f r o n w ^ i c n the i a t a was 1^1^^^, we can on] v determine
thgt the o a 1 1 e r n * a s v ::> 1 i j for t^e test environment* an-, we
cannot it; a k e j n y n r o a : >~ r sta^e^ent. f h e r e was a ootential
weakness in •: r - , . r -> { r that it « a s corroosed p n t i r e 1 v of
s 1j o j e c t i v e i n t? u t s e i r*> j relate*? r ° on i e c t i v e i n pu t s . fitter
subjective ^ n o o n i a c r i v e incuts have been correlated tne
62

o r o c e s s an^ m o d *» 1 should he aM e •" o na'e m o r e definitive
ttn^Tents ano r e a * - 5 r o 3 d e r conclusions. • t^ have carried
out 3 n i 1 o t study r - 5 r r ^ - r 103'.
i ^ i s lv c r k offers r»l it-? " s * o the re a 1e r . '* aen e r a I
i e s c r i o i o r ?n~ . - >t ,•> f ? 5 v st st h 3 v e "•:i e n Drovided.
3 o^ e i n s i a h t s ?re a « i r e d into i n 'i i v i iu a 1 hu^an factors and
t n e profl e^s ef, cou r|,j,- -?i when ar tn^rt im to to research on
t h e m . Potential o i t f a 1 1 s of 1 p a 1 i n a W i t h human ^ac tors* sub"
j e c t i v e inouts; ^ n d an v/ a n s i 'r n 1 i f i e d e n y i r o n ro e n t a r e i d e n *
t i f i e d « M t h o u o r. the n u r c o s e o * f i n rj i no 1 3 o 1 i o rat tern of
interelations^irs •" ? r • rt " " the v a r i a o I e «? on -1 broad scale
could n o t be kco-^o I 1 •1 ?r« 1 f i C i e n t merit in t h
a n r < to warrant consideration of experimental redesign and
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